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Financial System Structure and Economic Development:
Structure Matters
by O. Emre Ergungor
This paper investigates how the structure of a financial system—whether it is bank or market oriented—
affects economic growth.  In contrast to earlier research, which indicates that the financial system’s
structure is irrelevant for growth, I find that countries grow faster when they have flexible judicial system
and more market-oriented financial systems.
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Are bank-based or market-based ¯nancial systems better for promoting long-run eco-
nomic growth? A series of recent papers ¯nds that the structure of the system is
irrelevant. Neither type is more e®ective than the other at promoting growth; what
matters is the ¯nancial system's overall level of development (see, for example, Rajan
and Zingales, 1998a; LaPorta et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000; Beck
et al., 2001; Levine, 2002). The evidence I provide in this paper contradicts the ¯rst
observation. I ¯nd that after controlling for the e®ect of overall ¯nancial development
on growth, the structure of the ¯nancial system still matters; when countries have °ex-
ible judicial systems, which can adapt laws to changing economic conditions, markets
are better than banks in promoting long-run economic growth. In in°exible systems,
the advantage of markets disappears.
So, there is a discrepancy with the earlier studies because I factor in judicial °exibil-
ity. Beck et al. (2003) show that legal origin matters in ¯nancial development because
legal traditions di®er in their ability to adapt. This appears to be the most economi-
cally meaningful factor that sets legal traditions apart |compared to the di®erences
in property rights protection. Ergungor (2003) shows that in civil-law countries where
judges lack interpretive °exibility (i.e., the ability to adapt by interpreting the laws
and creating new rules), ¯nancial systems are bank-oriented. The reason is that in
in°exible judicial systems, the risk of an unfair verdict makes the writing of one-time
1bilateral (market) contracts problematic. Banks emerge in civil-law countries as in-
stitutions that can resolve con°icts using their market power and enforce contracts
without court intervention.1
Based on these observations, I argue in this paper that in an in°exible judicial
environment, banks' vital role in the economy as contract enforcers makes them an
important engine for economic growth. In other words, the positive in°uence of markets
on growth disappears in these economies because banks assume additional roles to
compensate for the in°exibility of the judicial system. As °exibility increases, this role
becomes less critical and the advantage of a market-based system becomes apparent.
This paper also investigates the channels through which judicial °exibility and
¯nancial structure in°uence output growth; namely the growth of the capital stock and
productivity. I ¯nd that the main channel linking judicial °exibility and output growth
runs through the growth of the capital stock. A °exible judicial system together with a
market-oriented ¯nancial system induces more capital-intensive investment. Although
the connection between liquid markets and a high rate of capital stock growth is well-
established (see, for example, Levine and Zervos, 1998), the observation that markets
are better than banks only in °exible judicial environments is new.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. Section
1Also see Rajan and Zingales (1998b), LaPorta et al. (2000), Johnson et al. (2000), and Egli et al.
(2001). The source of the civil-law courts' in°exibility is deeply rooted in history. See, for example,
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Ergungor (2003) and Beck et al. (2003) for the historical background.
2III presents the results from cross-country regressions. Section IV concludes.
II Data and Method
I estimate a model that expresses real per capita GDP growth (Growth), the growth rate
of the per capita capital stock (Cap Growth) and productivity growth (Prod Growth)
as a function of overall ¯nancial development measured by the activity of markets and
banks (Fin Dev).2 I also include the structure ¯nancial system, which is measured by
the activity of markets relative to banks (Fin Str; higher values indicate more dominant
markets), the °exibility of the judicial system (Flexibility), and a number of economic,
social, and political factors listed in Table 1. Simple correlations are presented in Table
2.
I use two estimation techniques. The ¯rst is ordinary least squares using White's
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The regression is of the form:
Growth = ® + ¯finFin Dev + ¯strFin Str + ¯str£flexFin Str £ Flexibility
+¯flexFlexibility + ¯0[Control Variables] + ²
(1)
2I study the growth rate of per capita GDP in the 1980{1995 period. Using a longer time hori-
zon such as 1960-1995 does not have any material e®ect on the results. To obtain productivity
growth, Levine and Zervos (1998) let per capita output growth equal ·(per capita capital stock
growth)+(productivity growth). After obtaining output and capital stock growth data, they set the
capital share parameter equal to 1/3 and compute productivity growth as a residual. It is a reasonable
measure given the large number of countries and I use it in this paper.
3As Beck et al. (2001) and Levine (2002) point out, pure size of the ¯nancial system is
not a robust predictor of growth. It is the liquidity that matters. That is why I use
an activity measure that includes total value traded in the stock market rather than a
size measure that would include market capitalization (see Table 1 for more details).
Flexibility captures how much °exibility judges have in their decision making. It is
calculated as one minus the \Legal Justi¯cation" index developed by Djankov et al.
(2003) that measures the level of legal justi¯cation required in the legal process.3 If
complaints and/or rulings must be justi¯ed by statutory law, the legal system has low
Flexibility. The intuition is that the requirement to explain the ruling with reference
to the word of law shows how di±cult it is for the court system to move beyond the
law and adapt itself to changing conditions without legislative action. Also, if the legal
system forbids the judge to justify her judgment in equity, the system has low Flexibility
(equity is justice given according to the judge's conscience; see Mattei, 2000).4 \Legal
Justi¯cation" has also been used by Beck et al. (2003) as a measure of \in°exibility".
I change it to a \°exibility" measure by subtracting it from one.5
The interaction term explains how judicial °exibility in°uences the e®ect of ¯nancial
3Djankov et al. (2003) measure the degree of legal justi¯cation required in two cases: eviction of a
tenant and check collection. To capture the overall °exibility of the system, I use the average of the
two measures.
4See Table 1 for a more detailed de¯nition and Table 3 for country values.
5I do this conversion because I prefer to talk in terms of °exibility rather than in°exibility. It has
no impact on the results.
4system structure on growth. Bank (relationship)-based systems are superior to market-
based systems in economies where courts' extreme obedience to the word of law leads
to unfair rulings and increases contracting costs for individual investors. So, I expect to
see a relatively less signi¯cant role for markets in countries where equity is not allowed
to be the basis of judgment. In other words, I expect ¯str£flex to be positive. Note that
I include in the analysis a measure of each country's rule of law tradition (Law) as well
as the integrity of its judicial system (Jud E±ciency) to make sure that Flexibility is
not simply capturing the e±ciency of the legal environment.
My second estimation technique controls for potential simultaneity. The ¯rst stage
consists of estimating the predicted values for Fin Dev and Fin Str. I follow the three
steps described below to obtain the predicted values:
1. For each variable, I choose the instruments that have the greatest explanatory
power measured by Adjusted R-square. This approach allows me to explain the
variability of the endogenous variables to the greatest extent possible. This is
important, as the predicted values are used as regressors in the next stage.
² The set that best explains Fin Dev, X1, consists of Shareholder, GDP, Gov-
ernment, In°ation, ¢In°ation, Ethnic, Creditor, BlackMarket, and Com-
mon
² The set that best explains Fin Str, X2, consists of Assassination, GDP, Gov-
ernment, In°ation, ¢In°ation, School, BlackMarket, Trade, and Common
52. Using a Chow-test, Ergungor (2003) ¯nds that common-law and civil-law coun-
tries have di®erent economic environments, where some economic and political
factors have dissimilar e®ects on the ¯nancial system. I run a Chow-test to con-
trol for this possibility. Note that in the following regressions, X1 and X2 do not
contain `Common'.
² I estimate
Fin Dev = ®1;CO £ Common + ®1;CI £ Civil + ¯0
1;COX1 £ Common +
¯0
1;CIX1 £ Civil + ²
where Civil is one minus Common. Then, I test the restriction ¯0
1;CO ¡
¯0
1;CI = 0. The restriction is rejected at 1 percent.
² I estimate




Then, I test the restriction ¯0
2;CO ¡ ¯0
2;CI = 0. The restriction is rejected
at 1 percent.
3. Because both restrictions are rejected in step 2, I use the predicted values from
that step, \ Fin Dev and \ Fin Str, in the growth regression.
The growth regression is again of the form:




6where X3 contains initial per capita GDP, schooling (investment in human capital),
and a standard set of identifying variables (see below). As before, I expect ¯str£flex to
be positive.
III Results
Table 4 presents the results from the OLS regressions (1). Overall ¯nancial development
promotes output growth ([1]). But ¯nancial system structure does matter. Keeping
¯nancial development constant, countries that have market-oriented ¯nancial systems
grow faster if they have °exible judicial systems ([2]-[9]). The surprising result is that
when I control for the structure of the ¯nancial system, the importance of overall
development disappears.
Keeping the level of judicial °exibility constant at 0.33 (lowest level of °exibility
in the high-°exibility sample; see Table 3), a one standard deviation increase in the
relative market activity (1.2) adds 1.4 percentage points |signi¯cant at 5 percent|
to the annual growth rate of the real per capita GDP using the largest estimate in [5].
This corresponds to 85 percent of the mean growth rate in the sample. However, a low
level of °exibility (Flexibility=0) destroys the positive impact of more active markets
and creates an environment in which ¯nancial system structure is irrelevant. In other
words, banks assume a greater role in the economy as courts become less °exible and
overshadow the markets.
7Yet one must be cautious in interpreting the OLS results because they do not take
simultaneity into consideration. In Table 5, I present the IV estimates. The results
are fundamentally the same. Overall ¯nancial development promotes economic growth
but its e®ect disappears when I control for the ¯nancial structure ([10] and [11]).
In regressions [12]-[18], I control for various social, political, and economic factors.
Markets are still better than banks in promoting economic growth if countries have
°exible judicial systems. Keeping the level of judicial °exibility constant at 0.33 and
using the largest estimate in [17], a one standard deviation increase in \ Fin Str (0.8)
adds 1.15 percent to the real per capita GDP growth rate |signi¯cant at 5 percent.
Even when I use the smallest estimate in [11], the e®ect is still positive (0.64) and
signi¯cant.
In Table 6, I analyze the channels that link °exibility and ¯nancial structure to
output growth. There are four crucial observations. First, overall ¯nancial develop-
ment matters for capital stock growth but not for productivity growth. Because of
the low capital share parameter (1/3), the positive e®ect of development disappears
in the output-growth regressions. Second, in an in°exible judicial environment (Flex-
ibility=0), the negative estimate for ¯Fin Str indicates that bank-oriented systems are
robustly associated with high levels of capital stock growth. As °exibility increases,
however, the positive ¯Fin Str£Flexibility suggests that ¯nancial systems dominated by
liquid markets induce more capital-intensive investment. Third, judicial °exibility is
robustly correlated with capital stock growth. Fourth, neither °exibility nor its interac-
8tion with ¯nancial structure matters for productivity growth. Markets are clearly better
than banks in promoting higher-return projects that stimulate productivity growth.
As a ¯nal note, I ran in°uence diagnostics to make sure that a small number of
observations do not have a large in°uence on the parameter estimates (available upon
request). Deleting odd countries such as Ghana and Trinidad and Tobago (extremely
high °exibility values) does not alter the results. The conclusions are not driven by
in°uential observations.
IV Conclusion
This paper ¯netunes the standard growth model commonly used in the literature. I
use a conditioning variable set that accounts for various political, economic, and social
factors, particularly the °exibility of judicial decision making.
The results contrast sharply with those in earlier papers. Financial system struc-
ture matters for economic growth. Markets are better than banks in stimulating the
economy in countries with °exible judicial systems. In fact, the importance of ¯nancial
structure overwhelms the importance of overall ¯nancial development in output growth
regressions. Although ¯nancial development still has a positive and signi¯cant impact
on capital stock growth, productivity seems to be in°uenced only by the structure of
the ¯nancial system.
These results have interesting implications. For example, as continental Europe
9moves toward more °exible Anglo-American principles in commercial and private law
(Wiegand, 1991), one would expect to see higher growth rates in those countries that
shift toward larger markets. This remains to be tested.
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13Table 1: Data De¯nitions
Variable De¯nition Sources
Cap Growth The average growth rate of real per capita capital stock over 1980-92 Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2001)
Growth The rate of real per capita GDP growth in the 1980-1995 period. Same as above.
Prod Growth Growth1980¡1992 ¡ 0:3£Cap Growth. Conglomerate indicator of technological
change, quality advances and resource allocation enhancements. See Levine
and Zervos (1998).
Same as above.
Fin Dev Measure of the activity of stock markets and banks. It equals the logarithm of
the value of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges divided by GDP
times the value of bank credits to the private sector divided by GDP.
Same as above.
Fin Str Measure of the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks. It equals
the logarithm of the value of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges
divided by the value of deposit money bank credits to the private sector.
Same as above.
Flexibility Average of six dummies that indicate whether or not the complaint and ruling
must be legally justi¯ed and whether the ruling must be founded on the law
rather than general equity arguments in disputes related to the eviction of a
tenant and check collection. It is de¯ned as one minus the \Legal Justi¯cation"
variable in Djankov et al. (2003). Higher values indicate more emphasis on











GDP Natural log of real per capita GDP in 1980 Same as above.
Government Share of government expenditure in GDP Same as above.
In°ation Log of in°ation rate in 1980-1995. Same as above.
¢In°ation Change in the in°ation rate from 1980 to 1995 to capture the fact that after
a high-in°ation crisis, growth accelerates as in°ation drops (see Bruno and
Easterly, 1998); higher values indicate an increase in in°ation
Same as above.
Trade The logarithm of international trade as a share of GDP Same as above.
Social and Political Factors
Assassination The number of assassinations per thousand inhabitants Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2001)
Bureau Measure of the quality of bureaucracy; high scores indicate autonomy from po-
litical pressures and strengths and expertise to govern without drastic changes
in policy or interruptions in government services; also existence of an estab-
lished mechanism for recruiting and training.
Same as above.
Common Dummy that equals 1 if a country belongs to the common-law tradition Same as above.
Corruption An indicator of the corruption in government; lower scores for higher corruption. Same as above.
Creditor An index aggregating di®erent creditor rights. Same as above.
Ethnic Average value of ¯ve indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, with values rang-





Social and Political Factors (cont'd)
French Dummy that equals 1 if a country belongs to the French civil-law tradition Same as above.
German Dummy that equals 1 if a country belongs to the German civil-law tradition Same as above.
Jud E±ciency E±ciency and integrity of the legal environment based on investors' assess-
ments of conditions in the country in question.
LaPorta et al.
(1998)
Law Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2001)
Liberty Indicator of civil liberties; lower scores for more freedom Same as above.
Scandinavian Dummy that equals 1 if a country belongs to the Scandinavian civil-law tradition Same as above.
School Natural log of (1+ average years of schooling in total population in 1980) Same as above.
Shareholder An index aggregating the shareholder rights. Same as above.
Revolution Number of revolutions and coups d'¶ etat Same as above.
1
6Table 2: Simple Correlations
Fin Dev Fin Str Flexibility Law GDP Liberty BlackMarket In°ation ¢ In°ation Trade
Fin Str 0.69¤¤¤ 1
Flexibility 0.09 0.15
Law 0.70¤¤¤ 0.33¤¤ 0.26¤ 1
GDP 0.64¤¤¤ 0.28¤ 0.15 0.86¤¤¤ 1
Liberty -0.44¤¤¤ -0.23 -0.08 -0.61¤¤¤ -0.69¤¤¤ 1
BlackMarket -0.61¤¤¤ -0.08 0.23 -0.43¤¤¤ -0.42¤¤¤ 0.31¤¤ 1
In°ation -0.37¤¤¤ 0.11 -0.29¤¤ -0.36¤¤ -0.19 0.23 0.37¤¤ 1
¢ In°ation -0.12 0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.28¤ 0.07 0.24 -0.28¤ 1
Trade 0.18 -0.06 0.41¤¤¤ 0.18 0.14 -0.09 -0.18 -0.42¤¤¤ 0.01 1
Government 0.28¤ -0.09 0.31¤¤ 0.42¤¤¤ 0.48¤¤¤ -0.31¤¤ -0.30¤¤ -0.32¤¤ -0.29¤¤ 0.25¤
Corrupt 0.71¤¤¤ 0.39¤¤¤ 0.24¤ 0.85¤¤¤ 0.85¤¤¤ -0.64¤¤¤ -0.41¤¤¤ -0.27¤ -0.19 0.16
Bureau 0.71¤¤¤ 0.40¤¤¤ 0.30¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 0.76¤¤¤ -0.61¤¤¤ -0.41¤¤¤ -0.36¤¤ -0.06 0.09
School 0.64¤¤¤ 0.36¤¤ 0.20 0.71¤¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤ -0.67¤¤¤ -0.43¤¤¤ -0.21 -0.44¤¤¤ 0.13
Assassination -0.19 0.04 -0.42¤¤¤ -0.45¤¤¤ -0.31¤¤ 0.06 0.01 0.20 -0.08 -0.37¤¤¤
Revolution -0.25¤ 0.02 -0.16 -0.47¤¤¤ -0.40¤¤¤ 0.36¤¤ 0.24 0.14 -0.08 -0.18
Shareholder 0.17 0.15 0.30¤ -0.08 -0.12 0.21 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 -0.29¤
Creditor -0.07 -0.16 0.27¤ -0.12 -0.34¤¤ 0.22 0.04 -0.26 0.10 0.20
Jud E±ciency 0.52¤¤¤ 0.21 0.45¤¤¤ 0.65¤¤¤ 0.71¤¤¤ -0.67¤¤¤ -0.41¤¤¤ -0.37¤¤ -0.12 0.26¤
Ethnic -0.23 0.05 0.22 -0.43¤¤¤ -0.55¤¤¤ 0.45¤¤¤ 0.34¤¤ 0.01 0.13 -0.01
Government Corrupt Bureau School Assassination Revolution Shareholder Creditor Jud E±ciency
Government 1
Corrupt 0.56¤¤¤ 1
Bureau 0.47¤¤¤ 0.92¤¤¤ 1
School 0.43¤¤¤ 0.76¤¤¤ 0.67¤¤¤ 1
Assassination -0.32¤¤ -0.34¤¤ -0.32¤¤ -0.15 1
Revolution -0.28¤ -0.38¤¤¤ -0.38¤¤¤ -0.16 0.54¤¤¤ 1
Shareholder 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 1
Creditor 0.33¤¤ -0.10 -0.03 -0.28¤ -0.25 -0.04 0.09 1
Jud E±ciency 0.60¤¤¤ 0.80¤¤¤ 0.74¤¤¤ 0.76¤¤¤ -0.33¤¤ -0.42¤¤¤ 0.11 0.04 1
Ethnic -0.11 -0.30¤¤ -0.25¤ -0.33¤¤ 0.23 0.42¤¤¤ 0.27¤ 0.33¤¤ -0.331¤¤
¤¤¤ Signi¯cant at 1 percent ¤¤ Signi¯cant at 5 percent ¤ Signi¯cant at 10 percent
1
7Table 3: Country List
Low Flexibility High Flexibility
Flexibility Below Mean (Median) Flexibility Above Mean (Median)
Argentina (0.00) Ecuador (0.17) Chile (0.33) Denmark (0.67)
Austria (0.00) Israel (0.17) Cyprus (0.33) Australia (0.67)
Brazil (0.00) Italy (0.17) Finland (0.33) Belgium (0.67)
Colombia (0.00) Japan (0.17) Netherlands (0.33) Ireland (0.67)
Egypt (0.00) Sri Lanka (0.17) Norway (0.33) Jamaica (0.67)
France (0.00) Switzerland (0.17) Pakistan (0.33) Kenya (0.67)
Germany (0.00) Thailand (0.17) Taiwan (0.33) New Zealand (0.67)
Greece (0.00) Turkey (0.17) Tunisia (0.33) Sweden (0.67)
Honduras (0.00) Zimbabwe (0.33) U.K. (0.67)
India (0.00) U.S.A. (0.33) Canada (0.83)
Mexico (0.00) South Africa (0.50) Malaysia (0.83)
Panama (0.00) Ghana (1.00)




Note: Flexibility values are in parantheses. The mean is 0.31 and the median is 0.25. Low Flexibility versus High
Flexibility classi¯cation above is intended to make it easier for the reader to see which countries rely more heavily on
law. The mean (median) is an ad hoc choice.
18Table 4: The E®ect of Financial System Development and Structure on Eco-
nomic Growth (OLS Estimates)
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth (1980-1995)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Intercept 9.559¤¤¤ 7.377¤¤¤ 7.375¤¤¤ 11.330¤¤¤ 9.286¤¤¤ 9.462¤¤¤ 9.687¤¤¤ 8.021¤¤¤ 6.585¤¤¤
(2.151) (1.819) (1.831) (2.113) (2.980) (2.252) (1.902) (2.232) (2.068)
Fin Dev 0.286¤ -0.171 -0.170 -0.056 -0.335 -0.317 -0.302 -0.146 -0.101
(0.147) (0.287) (0.285) (0.224) (0.304) (0.296) (0.308) (0.288) (0.292)
Fin Str 0.342 0.340 0.386 0.740 0.711 0.683 0.296 0.104
(0.436) (0.433) (0.393) (0.508) (0.493) (0.503) (0.441) (0.434)
Fin Str x Flexibility 1.487¤¤¤ 1.488¤¤¤ 1.044¤¤ 1.358¤¤ 1.400¤¤¤ 1.466¤¤¤ 1.497¤¤¤ 1.696¤¤¤
(0.393) (0.394) (0.426) (0.615) (0.492) (0.481) (0.395) (0.374)
Flexibility -1.556 0.721 0.727 0.361 0.144 0.343 0.437 0.878 -0.300
(0.982) (0.874) (0.877) (0.879) (1.627) (0.965) (0.990) (0.798) (1.228)
Law 0.482 0.702¤¤ 0.704¤¤ 0.613¤¤ 0.900¤¤ 0.887¤¤ 0.876¤¤ 0.703¤¤ 0.749¤¤
(0.400) (0.326) (0.340) (0.231) (0.346) (0.351) (0.372) (0.314) (0.296)
GDP -0.942¤¤ -0.825¤¤ -0.826¤¤ -1.295¤¤¤ -1.035¤¤ -1.032¤¤ -1.068¤¤ -0.854¤¤ -0.379
(0.426) (0.328) (0.333) (0.311) (0.496) (0.478) (0.433) (0.351) (0.396)
School -1.146 -1.224 -1.224 -1.162 -1.351 -1.366 -1.099 -1.345¤ -1.584¤¤
(0.846) (0.818) (0.816) (0.729) (0.850) (0.845) (1.066) (0.761) (0.736)
Revolution -0.905 -1.208¤¤ -1.214¤ -0.687 -1.385¤¤ -1.364¤¤ -1.527¤¤ -1.086¤ -0.892
(0.705) (0.561) (0.684) (0.480) (0.664) (0.645) (0.688) (0.557) (0.645)
BlackMarket 0.861 0.760 0.765 0.998 -2.049 -1.959 -1.650 0.715 1.060
(1.057) (0.816) (0.863) (0.728) (2.290) (2.127) (2.202) (0.811) (0.899)
In°ation -2.695¤¤¤ -3.761¤¤ -3.756¤¤ -3.788¤¤¤ -3.631¤ -3.653¤ -3.752¤ -3.620¤¤ -3.164¤¤
(0.782) (1.605) (1.625) (1.292) (2.030) (2.020) (2.001) (1.629) (1.461)
¢ In°ation -7.217¤¤¤ -8.830¤¤¤ -8.828¤¤¤ -8.717¤¤¤ -8.249¤¤¤ -8.353¤¤¤ -8.250¤¤¤ -8.888¤¤¤ -8.400¤¤¤
(1.347) (1.636) (1.627) (1.279) (2.483) (2.240) (2.251) (1.631) (1.737)
Trade 0.018¤¤ 0.020¤¤ 0.020¤¤ 0.020¤¤ 0.012 0.011¤¤ 0.011¤¤ 0.019¤¤ 0.026¤¤¤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Government -0.092¤¤ -0.067¤ -0.067¤ -0.058¤ -0.026 -0.031 -0.022 -0.068¤¤ -0.146¤¤¤
(0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) (0.033) (0.042)
Corrupt -0.265 -0.880¤ -0.880¤ -0.520 -0.588 -0.556 -0.557 -0.865¤ -1.080¤¤¤
(0.511) (0.443) (0.443) (0.402) (0.427) (0.415) (0.412) (0.423) (0.376)
Bureau 0.660¤¤ 1.048¤¤¤ 1.047¤¤¤ 0.918¤¤ 0.636¤¤ 0.620¤¤ 0.645¤¤ 1.023¤¤¤ 1.061¤¤¤



















Adj. R2 38 51 49 56 52 52 53 49 58
DF 32 30 29 29 23 23 23 29 27
(¯Str + 0:33 £ ¯Str£Flex) 0.83¤ 0.83¤ 0.73¤ 1.19¤¤ 1.17¤¤ 1.17¤¤ 0.79¤ 0.66
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
¤¤¤ Signi¯cant at 1 percent ¤¤ Signi¯cant at 5 percent ¤ Signi¯cant at 10 percent
19Table 5: The E®ect of Financial System Development and Structure on Eco-
nomic Growth (IV Estimates)
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth (1980-1995)
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]
Intercept 12.205¤¤¤ 14.499¤¤¤ 15.408¤¤¤ 15.049¤¤¤ 15.565¤¤¤ 14.315¤¤¤ 13.535¤¤¤ 15.907¤¤¤ 17.856¤¤¤
(3.223) (2.972) (3.024) (3.102) (2.861) (3.105) (2.328) (3.146) (3.209)
Fin Dev 0.609¤¤ 0.501 0.331 0.212 0.257 0.219 0.397 0.290 0.503
(0.224) (0.320) (0.326) (0.342) (0.284) (0.350) (0.266) (0.307) (0.331)
Fin Str 0.150 0.478 0.500 0.547 0.528 0.376 0.652 0.273
(0.437) (0.579) (0.599) (0.518) (0.568) (0.497) (0.566) (0.598)
Fin Str x Flexibility 2.136¤¤ 2.428¤¤ 2.219¤ 2.538¤¤ 2.090¤ 2.487¤¤¤ 2.383¤¤ 3.019¤¤
(0.910) (1.063) (1.143) (1.049) (1.125) (0.861) (1.070) (1.208)
Flexibility -0.634 4.217¤ 4.649¤¤ 4.149¤ 4.990¤¤ 3.941 3.315¤ 4.504¤ 5.823¤¤
(1.054) (2.099) (2.191) (2.314) (2.149) (2.351) (1.887) (2.245) (2.341)
GDP -0.755¤¤ -1.004¤¤ -1.163¤¤ -1.193¤¤ -1.165¤¤ -0.953¤ -0.963¤¤ -1.163¤¤ -1.318¤¤
(0.354) (0.397) (0.487) (0.517) (0.470) (0.520) (0.432) (0.478) (0.483)
School -1.010 -1.534 -1.924¤ -1.714 -1.638 -2.172¤¤ -1.545 -1.989¤ -1.840
(0.959) (0.955) (1.064) (1.052) (1.178) (1.037) (0.932) (1.029) (1.100)
In°ation -3.351¤¤¤ -4.195¤¤ -4.289¤¤ -3.505¤ -4.625¤¤¤ -4.595¤¤ -2.907¤ -4.778¤¤¤ -3.667¤¤
(1.045) (1.568) (1.572) (1.861) (1.468) (1.676) (1.415) (1.538) (1.621)
¢ In°ation -5.461¤¤¤ -7.538¤¤¤ -9.781¤¤¤ -8.955¤¤¤ -9.940¤¤¤ -10.004¤¤¤ -8.815¤¤¤ -10.254¤¤¤ -10.026¤¤¤
(1.688) (2.047) (2.396) (2.684) (2.346) (2.424) (2.018) (2.281) (2.350)
Revolution -1.724¤¤ -2.182¤¤¤ -1.671¤¤ -1.737¤¤ -1.921¤¤ -1.468¤ -1.796¤¤ -1.477 -1.805¤¤
(0.733) (0.732) (0.806) (0.815) (0.850) (0.844) (0.799) (0.893) (0.840)
French 0.575 1.175¤ 0.962¤ 0.742 0.916 0.585 0.334 1.133¤¤ 0.713
(0.496) (0.619) (0.510) (0.585) (0.552) (0.753) (0.597) (0.494) (0.659)
German 0.309 1.240 0.989 0.870 1.140¤ 0.622 0.337 0.983 0.740
(0.791) (0.841) (0.657) (0.661) (0.657) (0.844) (0.713) (0.673) (0.765)
Scandinavian 0.631 1.907¤¤ 2.197¤¤ 1.905¤¤ 2.288¤¤¤ 2.004¤¤ 2.284¤¤¤ 2.327¤¤¤ 2.281¤¤¤
(0.492) (0.758) (0.790) (0.861) (0.797) (0.822) (0.750) (0.798) (0.802)
Bureau 0.268 0.167 0.245 0.227 0.644¤ 0.282 0.307
(0.380) (0.381) (0.374) (0.378) (0.370) (0.392) (0.346)
Law 0.704¤ 0.723¤ 0.691 0.709¤ 0.685¤ 0.661 0.665¤
(0.403) (0.404) (0.431) (0.404) (0.366) (0.414) (0.374)
Corruption -0.722¤ -0.607 -0.625 -0.585 -1.353¤¤¤ -0.724¤ -0.784¤













Adj. R2 28 30 38 36 36 35 46 36 40
DF 29 27 24 23 23 23 23 23 23
(¯Str + 0:33 £ ¯Str£Flex) 0.86¤ 1.28¤¤ 1.23¤ 1.38¤¤ 1.22¤¤ 1.20¤¤ 1.44¤¤ 1.27¤¤
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
¤¤¤ Signi¯cant at 1 percent ¤¤ Signi¯cant at 5 percent ¤ Signi¯cant at 10 percent
20Table 6: The E®ect of Financial System Development and Structure on Components of Output Growth
(IV Estimates)
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Capital Stock and Productivity Growth (1980-1992)
Productivity Growth=Per Capita Output Growth - 0.3 Per Capita Capital Stock Growth
Capital Growth Productivity Growth
[19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31]
Fin Dev 0.788¤¤ 0.958¤¤¤ 0.665¤¤ 0.932¤¤¤ 1.007¤¤¤ 1.178¤¤¤ 0.364¤¤ 0.044 0.033 -0.023 -0.023 0.084 0.102
(0.304) (0.293) (0.280) (0.291) (0.275) (0.283) (0.171) (0.272) (0.271) (0.294) (0.250) (0.222) (0.291)
Fin Str -0.991¤ -0.937¤ -0.967¤ -1.067¤¤ -1.253¤¤ 0.776 0.875¤ 0.872¤ 0.937¤¤ 0.802¤¤ 0.822¤
(0.516) (0.530) (0.485) (0.469) (0.500) (0.495) (0.467) (0.474) (0.438) (0.379) (0.461)
Fin Str x Flexibility 5.624¤¤¤ 5.110¤¤¤ 5.662¤¤¤ 5.667¤¤¤ 6.377¤¤¤ 0.741
(0.834) (0.930) (0.858) (0.735) (0.874) (0.931)
Flexibility -0.752 11.135¤¤¤ 9.909¤¤¤ 11.254¤¤¤ 10.141¤¤¤ 12.634¤¤¤ -0.639 1.309 -0.272 -0.297 -0.190 -1.395 -0.307
(1.519) (1.884) (2.007) (1.907) (1.978) (1.879) (0.777) (1.996) (0.825) (0.815) (0.810) (0.888) (0.816)
BlackMarket -5.736¤¤ -1.122
(2.238) (2.452)






Adj. R2 7 40 43 38 43 44 28 30 32 29 30 39 30
DF 26 24 23 23 23 23 26 24 25 24 24 24 24
For the sake of brevity, I only include the results on the variables of interest. All regressions include GDP, School, In°ation, ¢ In°ation, Revolution, French,
German, Scandinavian, Bureau, Law, Corruption.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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